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CHIPPING AWAY AT THE ROCK: PEREZ V. 
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION AND THE 
SEMINOLE ROCK DEFERENCE DOCTRINE 
Kevin O. Leske∗ 
          Largely escaping judicial and scholarly examination for close to 
seventy years, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine directs federal 
courts to defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulation unless such interpretation “is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.” But at long last the United States 
Supreme Court is poised to re-evaluate the doctrine. 
          In March 2015, in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, the 
Court addressed whether a federal agency was required to follow the 
notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act 
after it changed a prior interpretation of its regulation under the 
“Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.” Although the Supreme Court 
unanimously found the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine impermissible, 
thereby restoring the plain language requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the case implicated the Seminole Rock deference 
doctrine, especially through the several concurring opinions, which 
focused exclusively on the doctrine. 
          Accordingly, this Article explores the justices’ various opinions 
in order to explain the compelling practical and constitutional reasons 
why the Seminole Rock regime cannot be ignored any further. The 
Article concludes that when the Supreme Court re-examines the 
doctrine, it should do so with the intent to bring clarity to this important 
area of federal administrative law. 
  
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law. I would like to thank Dean 
Leticia Diaz for her support. I am also grateful to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review for their excellent work. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1945, the United States Supreme Court, in Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,1 held federal courts must defer to an 
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation unless 
the interpretation “is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”2 This deference doctrine has significant practical 
ramifications because, through the evolution of our administrative 
state, agency regulations have become the key way whereby the 
rights and obligations of private parties are established.3 
It is therefore unsurprising that Seminole Rock questions “arise 
as a matter of course on a regular basis” during judicial review.4 
However, despite its importance to the regulated community (and to 
the administrative state, in general), the Seminole Rock deference 
regime has not received anywhere near the attention lavished on the 
Chevron doctrine,5 its “doctrinal cousin,” which applies to a court’s 
review of a statutory provision.6 
But why should we be concerned with the existing Seminole 
Rock standard? In short, there are several constitutional and practical 
problems with affording agencies a level of deference that scholars 
 
 1. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 2. Id. at 414. The Seminole Rock doctrine has been more recently referred to as “Auer 
deference” as a result of the case of Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). It remains a 
mystery why the courts, as well as the legal community, began calling it Auer deference, instead 
of Seminole Rock deference. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1088–89 & n.26 (2008) (observing and seeking to explain Justice 
Scalia’s use of the term in his dissent in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 277 (2006) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
 3. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 614–15 (1996) (explaining because 
agency rules affect the public’s legal rights more directly than statutes, the Seminole Rock 
doctrine requires closer scrutiny); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (stating that the Seminole Rock doctrine goes “to the heart of 
administrative law”). 
 4. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 5. Kevin O. Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place: A New Approach to Agency 
Deference, 46 CONN. L. REV. 227, 229 (2013) [hereinafter Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a 
Hard Place] (asserting unlike Chevron, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine has “gone largely 
unexamined”); Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock 
Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 99 (2000) (The 
Seminole Rock deference doctrine has “lurked beneath the surface and evaded scholarly and 
judicial criticism.”); see also cf. Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative 
Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 587, 589 (1984) (“Although commentators 
have lavished attention on the subject of statutory construction, they have virtually ignored the 
problem of how to interpret regulations.”). 
 6. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
378 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:375 
have referred to as “controlling” deference because it essentially 
compels a court to accept the agency’s interpretation of an 
ambiguous regulatory provision.7 
One constitutional concern is that the Seminole Rock standard 
raises separation of powers issues. Professor John F. Manning’s 1996 
law review article details how deferring to an administrative agency 
under Seminole Rock effectively permits the agency to both make the 
law (because its regulation has the force of law) and also interpret 
that “law” (because it receives controlling deference for its 
subsequent interpretation).8 According to Manning, such an ability of 
“self-interpretation”9 “contradicts a major premise of our 
constitutional scheme and of contemporary separation of powers case 
law—that a fusion of lawmaking and law-exposition is especially 
dangerous to our liberties.”10 
And leading up to the Court’s recent interest in the doctrine, 
scholars have asserted the Seminole Rock standard can encourage an 
agency “to promulgate excessively vague legislative rules” and 
“leave the more difficult task of specification to the more flexible 
and unaccountable process of later ‘interpreting’ these open-ended 
regulations.”11 More simply stated, an agency need not speak with 
 
 7. As I did in my past articles on the Seminole Rock doctrine, Leske, Between Seminole 
Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 230, and Kevin O. Leske, Splits in the Rock: The 
Conflicting Interpretations of the Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine by the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 787 (2014) [hereinafter Leske, Splits in the Rock], I will refer to 
Seminole Rock deference as “controlling” deference because it conforms to the Court’s view that 
the agency’s “administrative interpretation . . . becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414; accord Weaver, supra 
note 5, at 591 (calling certain deference rules, including Seminole Rock’s, “controlling” because 
they are outcome determinative). 
 Although other scholars have referred to it as “binding deference,” the effect is the same. 
See Manning, supra note 3, at 617 (discussing the concept of “binding deference,” which requires 
“a reviewing court to accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous legal texts, even 
when a court would construe those materials differently as a matter of first impression”). 
 8. See Manning, supra note 3, at 638–39, 654, 696 (discussing the “separation of 
lawmaking from law-exposition,” and arguing that the Seminole Rock standard fails the 
separation of powers analysis). 
 9. See Manning, supra note 3, at 655 (“The right of self-interpretation under Seminole Rock 
removes an important affirmative reason for the agency to express itself clearly; since the agency 
can say what its own regulations mean (unless the agency’s view is plainly erroneous), the agency 
bears little, if any, risk of its own opacity or imprecision.”). 
 10. Manning, supra note 3, at 617. 
 11. Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency 
Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 290 (2000); see also Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The 
Court’s Deferences―A Foolish Inconsistency, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, 10, 10–11 (2000) 
(suggesting if an agency knows that a court will defer to its regulatory interpretation, it creates “a 
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clarity when promulgating regulations because it knows it will be 
given deference when it subsequently interprets its vague regulation 
informally (i.e., without engaging in the notice-and-comment process 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)).12 
Relatedly, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine—as it has been 
currently interpreted and applied by courts—conflicts with the APA. 
The APA directs courts to determine “the meaning or applicability of 
the terms of an agency action.”13 But Seminole Rock’s controlling 
deference standard completely undermines the court’s role in this 
respect. By applying the Seminole Rock standard, no longer do 
“affected persons . . . [have] recourse to an independent judicial 
interpreter of the agency’s legislative act.”14 The loss of the court as 
a “check” on the propriety of an agency regulation is especially 
troublesome because “the agency is often an adverse party” in a case 
involving the interpretation of that regulation.15 
Starting in 2011, however, members of the Court have begun to 
highlight their interest in re-evaluating the Seminole Rock doctrine.16 
Justice Scalia has been especially insistent in conveying his 
newfound discontent with the doctrine. First, in Talk America, Inc. v. 
 
powerful incentive for agencies to issue vague regulations, with the thought of creating the 
operative regulatory substance later through informal interpretations”). 
 12. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); see Thomas Jefferson 
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is perfectly 
understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague regulations, because to do so maximizes 
agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather than 
through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”); see also Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. 
Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1309 (2007) 
(stating “the [Seminole Rock] doctrine may tempt agencies to issue vague regulations through the 
relatively burdensome notice-and-comment process”). 
 13. Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 
10 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1996) (arguing § 706 of the APA requires a court to determine the 
meaning of the terms of an agency action thereby “arm[ing] affected persons with recourse to an 
independent judicial interpreter of the agency’s legislative act, where, after all, the agency is often 
an adverse party”). 
 14. Anthony, supra note 13, at 9. Professor Anthony asserts that the Seminole Rock doctrine 
contradicts the APA’s purpose in another way: by allowing an “exception for interpretative rules 
in § 553” because such rules should be subject to “plenary judicial review.” Anthony & Asimow, 
supra note 11, at 11 (citation omitted). 
 15. Anthony, supra note 13, at 9. 
 16. This is not to say the Court has been completely silent on the doctrine. See, e.g., Mullins 
Coal Co. of Va. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 484 U.S. 135, 
170 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Seminole Rock deference must not be “a license for an 
agency effectively to rewrite a regulation through interpretation.”) (citing Bowles, 325 U.S. at 
414); Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating “agency rules 
should be clear and definite so that affected parties will have adequate notice concerning the 
agency’s understanding of the law.”); see generally, Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard 
Place, supra note 5 (reviewing the development of the doctrine). 
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Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,17 he observed that he “in the past 
[had] uncritically accepted that [deference] rule,” but now he had 
“become increasingly doubtful of its validity.”18 He expressly 
indicated he would be receptive to reconsidering the doctrine in a 
future case.19 The following year, in Decker v. Northwest 
Environmental Defense Center,20 Justice Scalia took his objections a 
step further by stating he would abandon the doctrine because it had 
“no principled basis [and] contravenes one of the great rules of 
separation of powers [that he] who writes a law must not adjudge its 
violation.”21 No doubt prompted by Justice Scalia’s opinion, Chief 
Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, wrote separately to concede 
that it “may be appropriate to reconsider that principle in an 
appropriate case” where “the issue is properly raised and argued.”22 
The chief justice concluded by emphasizing the legal community 
should now be “aware that there is some interest in reconsidering 
those cases.”23 
The Court’s concern for the issues raised by the Seminole Rock 
doctrine reached its apex in 2015 in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers 
Association.24 Although the case did not directly raise the doctrine, 
the Court addressed a related doctrine conceived by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit involving the 
notice-and-comment procedures under the APA.25 Under the 
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation 
an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it would 
formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice 
and comment rulemaking.”26 
In its March 2015 decision, the Court unanimously struck down 
the D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.27 Notably, however, 
 
17. 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011). 
 18. Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 19. Id. 
20.  133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013). 
 21. Id. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “I believe 
that it is time to do so”). 
 22. Id. at 1338–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 23. Id. 
 24. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The 
court revisited (and re-affirmed) this holding later in Alaska Professional Hunters Ass’n v. 
Federal Aviation Administration, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir.1999), but the doctrine is most 
often cited as the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine. 
 27. Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). 
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the majority opinion was narrowly written and was accompanied by 
several concurring opinions that wrote more broadly on agency 
deference issues.28 Specifically, Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas 
each penned opinions concurring in the judgment, but they focused 
on the Seminole Rock deference doctrine and expressed their views 
that the doctrine should be re-evaluated.29 
With now four justices (which is generally regarded as the 
number of “votes” necessary to grant a petition for a writ of 
certiorari)30 expressly interested in re-evaluating the doctrine in an 
appropriate case, there seems little doubt that the Court will soon 
hear a case implicating the doctrine. Accordingly, this Article 
analyzes the Court’s various opinions in Mortgage Bankers, which 
will likely prove pivotal to Seminole Rock’s future. 
Part I of this Article begins by briefly reviewing the Seminole 
Rock doctrine, its theoretical underpinnings, and the Supreme 
Court’s recent interest in the doctrine.31 Part II explains the 
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, which was the basis for the appeal in 
the Mortgage Bankers case. Part III then analyzes the Court’s 
opinions in Mortgage Bankers to highlight the key concerns, as well 
as to evaluate the views of members of the Court, which will likely 
be “in play” during the full Court’s near certain re-examination. The 
Article concludes that the legitimate constitutional and practical 
problems expressed by these justices favor re-evaluating the doctrine 
in a way that would mitigate these concerns to bring more fairness 
and consistency to our administrative state. 
II.  THE SEMINOLE ROCK DEFERENCE DOCTRINE 
Before analyzing the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine and Mortgage 
Bankers case, it is valuable to briefly examine the Seminole Rock 
doctrine, which was implicated by the Supreme Court’s decision. 
Accordingly, this Part begins by summarizing the facts and the 
Court’s ruling in Seminole Rock.32 Next, it identifies the legal 
foundation for establishing the doctrine that was not specified by the 
Court until nearly half a century later. Last, it introduces the recent 
 
 28. Id. (addressing Paralyzed Veterans doctrine only). 
 29. Id. See Part II. 
 30. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 529 (1957) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting) (describing “rule of four”). 
 31. See Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 244–71 
(describing the Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of the Seminole Rock doctrine). 
 32. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
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cases where the Court has demonstrated an interest in the doctrine to 
help place the opinions in the Mortgage Bankers case in context. 
A.  Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. 
In the Supreme Court’s 1945 decision in Seminole Rock, the 
Court created the standard to apply when courts review an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation.33 Under Seminole Rock, a court 
must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its regulation unless it “is 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”34 
In Seminole Rock, the Court was required to analyze “Maximum 
Price Regulation No. 188,” which mandated “each seller shall charge 
no more than the prices which he charged during the selected base 
period of March 1 to 31, 1942.”35 This regulation had been enacted 
under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, which was aimed at 
preventing inflation during World War II by controlling prices.36 
The controversy involved whether Seminole Rock & Sand had 
violated the regulation by negotiating a contract to sell crushed stone 
for more than the price established during the base period.37 Chester 
Bowles, the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration, 
sought to enjoin Seminole Rock & Sand from selling based on the 
fact that there had been an actual delivery in March 1942 for a lower 
price.38 Although it conceded it had delivered crushed stone for a 
lower price, Seminole Rock & Sand argued that there must have 
been both a charge and a delivery at a given price to fix the ceiling 
price.39 Because the contract for that delivery occurred in October 
1941, it asserted the ceiling limit had not been exceeded.40 
The district court held Seminole Rock & Sand had not violated 
the Maximum Price Regulation and, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed.41 Thus, the central issue for the Supreme Court was 
whether Seminole Rock & Sand charged a price that was greater than 
the maximum established during the regulatory period.42 The Court 
first noted the Administrator’s interpretation of the regulation would 
 
 33. Id. at 411. 
 34. Id. at 414. 
 35. Id. at 413. 
 36. Id. at 411, 413. 
 37. Id. at 412, 415. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 415. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 412–13. 
 42. Id. at 413. 
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only be helpful if the regulation was ambiguous.43 If ambiguous, the 
Court found “a court must necessarily look to the administrative 
construction of the regulation.”44 And as to the deference a court 
should afford an agency’s view, the Court held “the ultimate 
criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of 
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulation.”45 
The Court found the regulation contained an ambiguous phrase: 
“highest price charged during March, 1942.”46 It then looked to the 
“administrative construction” of the regulation set forth in a bulletin 
issued at the time the Maximum Price Regulation was issued.47 
Based on “the consistent administrative interpretation” set forth in 
the Bulletin interpreting that phrase, the Court found that the highest 
price of an actual delivery during March 1942 established the price 
ceiling.48 Thus, in deferring to the agency’s interpretation of the 
regulation, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.49 
B.  A Brief Doctrinal Explanation of Seminole Rock 
In its opinion in Seminole Rock, the Court did not provide a 
justification for giving the agency’s interpretation “controlling 
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”50 The basis for the Seminole Rock standard emerged in 
two cases over thirty years later. 
In the 1991 case of Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Review Commission,51 the Court stated that judicial deference to 
agency interpretations was rooted in the agency’s delegated 
lawmaking powers. That same year, in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, 
Inc.,52 the Court further explained the authority to interpret 
 
 43. Id. at 413–14. 
 44. Id. at 414. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 415. 
 47. Id. at 417. 
 48. Id. at 415, 418. The Court also seemed to place significant weight on the fact that the 
public had been placed on notice of this consistent interpretation. Id. at 417–18. 
 49. Id. at 418. 
 50. Id. at 414. 
 51. 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991) (“Because applying an agency’s regulation to complex or 
changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, 
we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the 
agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”) (citation omitted). For additional background on 
Martin, see Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 227. 
52.  501 U.S. 680 (1991). 
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regulations was embedded in the delegation to an agency by 
Congress.53 And the controlling deference standard of Seminole Rock 
applied by courts to these interpretations naturally follows from this 
congressional delegation.54 
During these cases, the Court did not critically analyze the 
doctrine or identify any perceived problems associated with the 
Seminole Rock standard. Nor did the doctrine garner any immediate 
attention by either scholars or the justices. And in the following 
years, the Supreme Court and appellate courts began developing 
various factors to look to when applying the standard without regard 
to whether those factors were consistent with the doctrine’s 
underpinnings or might otherwise be problematic.55 But nonetheless 
the standard developed into an immensely important principle of 
administrative law that has largely “lurked beneath the surface and 
evaded scholarly and judicial criticism.”56 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Recent Interest in Seminole Rock 
Although the Court has been somewhat faithfully applying the 
Seminole Rock standard ever since it established the doctrine in 
1945, it has not further elaborated on its foundation or engaged in a 
meaningful analysis of the doctrine.57 But this is not to say that 
members of the Court have not signaled their apprehension of 
applying the standard or of granting an agency controlling deference 
in some cases. For instance, Justice Thurgood Marshall warned that 
Seminole Rock deference must not be “a license for an agency 
 
 53. Id. For further background on Pauley, see Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard 
Place, supra note 5. 
 54. Pauley, 501 U.S. at 698 (“As delegated by Congress, then, the Secretary’s authority to 
promulgate interim regulations ‘not . . . more restrictive than’ the HEW [Health, Education, and 
Welfare] interim regulations necessarily entails the authority to interpret HEW’s regulations and 
the discretion to promulgate interim regulations based on a reasonable interpretation thereof. 
From this congressional delegation derives the Secretary’s entitlement to judicial deference.”). 
 55. Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 248–71 (describing 
factors applied in U.S. Supreme Court). For a detailed analysis of the interpretation of the courts 
of appeals, see Leske, Splits in the Rock, supra note 7. 
 56. Angstreich, supra note 5, at 99 (The Seminole Rock deference doctrine has “lurked 
beneath the surface and evaded scholarly and judicial criticism.”); Leske, Between Seminole 
Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 229 (asserting that unlike Chevron, the Seminole Rock 
deference doctrine has “gone largely unexamined”). 
 57. For a detailed review of the Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of the 
Seminole Rock doctrine, see Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 
248–71. 
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effectively to rewrite a regulation through interpretation.”58 
Similarly, Justice Clarence Thomas (joined by three colleagues) 
opined “agency rules should be clear and definite so that affected 
parties will have adequate notice concerning the agency’s 
understanding of the law.”59 
Yet only within the last five years have justices suggested they 
would consider reassessing the doctrine, including an explicit 
statement to that effect by Chief Justice Roberts during the Court’s 
2012–2013 Term.60 And as the opinions in the Mortgage Bankers 
case demonstrate, there are now enough members of the Court 
interested in the Seminole Rock doctrine to make a future grant of a 
writ of certiorari in a case that raises the issue a virtual certainty. 
Justice Scalia’s brief concurrence in the Court’s June 2011 
decision in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,61 
signaled his first of several efforts to make his colleagues aware of 
his newfound skepticism toward the Seminole Rock doctrine.62 In 
Talk America, the Court was called upon to decide whether the 
Telecommunications Act mandates that local telephone service 
providers offer competitors use of their transmission facilities at 
cost-based regulated rates.63 After determining the 
Telecommunications Act provision at issue and that the Federal 
Communications Commission’s (FCC) regulations were ambiguous, 
the Court looked to the FCC’s interpretation of its regulations.64 
Applying the Seminole Rock standard, the Court stated the 
application of the doctrine was dispositive: “The FCC as amicus 
curiae has advanced a reasonable interpretation of its regulations, 
and we defer to its views.”65 
 
 58. Mullins Coal Co. of Va. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, 484 U.S. 135, 170 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referencing Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414). 
See generally Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5 (reviewing 
development of the doctrine). 
 59. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 60. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338–39 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
 61. 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011). 
 62. Id. at 2265–66 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing how he would reach the same holding 
as the majority without relying on the Seminole Rock doctrine, since “the FCC’s [Federal 
Communications Commission’s] interpretation is the fairest reading of the orders in question”). 
 63. Id. at 2257 (majority opinion). 
 64. Id. at 2260–61. The FCC’s interpretation was that facilities must be made available if 
they were to be used “to link the incumbent provider’s telephone network with the competitor’s 
network for the mutual exchange of traffic.” Id. at 2257. 
 65. Id. at 2265. The FCC was not a party to the litigation but submitted an amicus curiae 
brief. Id. 
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Despite having joined the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia 
wrote separately to make known his disinclination to accept the 
Seminole Rock doctrine any longer: “For while I have in the past 
uncritically accepted that rule, I have become increasingly doubtful 
of its validity.”66 He ended his brief concurrence by announcing, 
“We have not been asked to reconsider Auer in the present case. 
When we are, I will be receptive to doing so.”67 
In the 2012 case of Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,68 
the Court explicitly declined to grant the Department of Labor 
(DOL) Seminole Rock deference.69 In SmithKline Beecham, the 
Court analyzed whether the DOL’s regulation defining “outside 
salesman” included pharmaceutical sales representatives.70 After 
reviewing the DOL regulations and DOL’s interpretation, it analyzed 
whether Seminole Rock deference should apply.71 Despite 
recognizing that deference was generally appropriate, the Court 
noted, “[T]his general rule does not apply in all cases.”72 
The Court looked to instances where it had declined to grant 
Seminole Rock deference, such as “when there is reason to suspect 
that the agency’s interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and 
considered judgment on the matter in question.’”73 After exploring 
these contours, the Court refused to grant Seminole Rock deference 
to DOL’s interpretation.74 While the Court did not express 
 
 66. Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia opined the doctrine encourages 
agencies to enact vague regulations, potentially violates the separation of powers doctrine, 
“frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary 
government.” Id. He also referred to the Seminole Rock doctrine as “Auer deference.” Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). 
 69. Id. at 2166–67. To support its decision to withhold agency deference, the Court cited 
several past cases, some of which are not even part of the Seminole Rock/Auer line of cases. Id. 
(referencing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 158 (1991) 
and NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974)). 
 70. Id. at 2161. 
 71. Id. at 2166. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2166 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). The Court detailed two 
instances when an agency’s interpretation might not reflect its fair and considered judgment: 
“when the agency’s interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation,” id. (citing Thomas 
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)), and when an agency’s interpretation 
appears to be “nothing more than a ‘convenient litigating position,’” or a ‘“post hoc 
rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack,” 
SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2166–67 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). 
 74. SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2168–69. The Court found that acceptance of the 
DOL’s interpretation would not give fair warning to the public and would constitute “unfair 
surprise.” Id. at 2167 (citation omitted). 
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reservation with the existence of the Seminole Rock doctrine vel non, 
it does represent the Court acknowledged the doctrine had 
limitations.75 
Following these cases, the Seminole Rock doctrine appeared at 
the forefront of two opinions in 2013 penned in Decker v. Northwest 
Environmental Defense Center.76 At issue in Decker was whether 
storm water runoff channeled from logging roads fell within a 
regulation promulgated under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) 
defining discharges into navigable waters.77 The United States, 
appearing as amicus curiae, asserted “[t]he EPA [Environmental 
Protection Agency] interprets its regulation to exclude the type of 
storm water discharges from logging roads at issue.”78 The Court 
found this to be a “reasonable interpretation of its own regulation,” 
and applying the Seminole Rock standard deferred to this 
interpretation.79 It explained not only was the “EPA’s 
interpretation . . . a permissible one,” but “there is no indication that 
the [EPA’s] current view [was] a change from prior practice or a post 
hoc justification adopted in response to litigation.”80 
Once again, Justice Scalia wrote separately express his disdain 
for the Seminole Rock doctrine.81 He decried “[e]nough is enough” 
with respect to “giving agencies the authority to say what their rules 
mean . . . under the harmless-sounding banner of” Seminole Rock 
deference.82 Prior to turning to facts at issue, he summed up his 
problem with the Seminole Rock doctrine as follows: “[H]owever 
 
 75. Id. at 2167. 
 76. 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1326 (2013). 
 77. Id. at 1330. A permit for such runoff is necessary if the discharge is “deemed to be 
‘associated with industrial activity.’” Those terms are interpreted under the Clean Water Act 
(CWA) and the implementing regulations issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
Id. (citation omitted). In turn, an EPA regulation defines “the term ‘associated with industrial 
activity’ to cover only discharges ‘from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying 
storm water and that is directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage 
areas at an industrial plant.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
 78. Id. at 1331. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1329–30, 1337 (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 
2166–67 (2012)). 
 81. Id. at 1339 (citing Talk America, Inc.,131 S. Ct. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). Justice Scalia also distinguished this case from Talk America, where the 
“agency’s interpretation of the rule was also the fairest one, and no party had asked [the Court] to 
reconsider.” Id. Here, he argued, the application of the Seminole Rock doctrine “ma[de] the 
difference.” Id. 
 82. Id. (citing Talk America, Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
388 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:375 
great may be the efficiency gains derived from Auer deference, 
beneficial effect cannot justify a rule that not only has no principled 
basis but contravenes one of the great rules of separation of powers: 
He who writes a law must not adjudge its violation.”83 
Justice Scalia’s opinion, standing alone, represented a 
significant milestone in the emerging debate on the Seminole Rock 
doctrine. But the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, joined 
by Justice Alito, was also notable for its clear goal to make the legal 
community aware that there were members of the Court interested in 
the Seminole Rock line of cases.84 Moreover, the opinion 
acknowledged that Justice Scalia’s opinion had raised “serious 
questions about the principle set forth” in Seminole Rock and Auer.85 
Based on the justices’ opinions in Decker, as well as in Talk 
America and SmithKline Beecham, it seemed beyond serious dispute 
that the Court would accept a case for review with the goal of  
reevaluating the Seminole Rock doctrine.86 But now, given the 
Court’s opinions in Mortgage Bankers, this event is inevitable. With 
that in mind, exploring the Mortgage Bankers case yields several 
important results. First, the analysis provides additional support for 
the need to re-examine Seminole Rock for doctrinal, rather than 
pragmatic, reasons as soon as possible. Next, the analysis serves a 
valuable point of reference for practitioners seeking to bring a case 
involving the Seminole Rock doctrine to the Supreme Court. Finally, 
the analysis contributes to the scarce, but now growing, scholarship 
in this important area of federal administrative law. 
III.  THE PARALYZED VETERANS DOCTRINE AND THE 
 MORTGAGE BANKERS CASE 
A.  Introduction 
The recent case of Mortgage Bankers has thrust the Seminole 
Rock deference doctrine into the spotlight. To help understand the 
justices’ impetus for highlighting the Seminole Rock doctrine in this 
 
 83. Id. at 1342. Justice Scalia would have determined regulation’s meaning by applying 
“familiar tools of textual interpretation,” such as the fairest reading of the regulations. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1339 (Robert, C.J., concurring) (making the legal bar “aware that there is some 
interest in reconsidering” Seminole Rock and Auer). 
 85. Id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 
U.S. 410 (1945) and Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). (The chief justice noted 
although “[i]t may be appropriate to reconsider that principle in an appropriate case,” he “would 
await a case in which the issue is properly raised and argued.”). 
 86. See infra Part III. 
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case, this section briefly explores the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine 
and the journey of the Mortgage Bankers case to the Supreme Court. 
B.  The Paralyzed Veterans Doctrine 
In Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.,87 the 
Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA) brought suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).88 The PVA maintained the 
wheelchair seating to be built in the new MCI Center in Washington, 
D.C., must provide lines of sight over standing spectators.89 
In the ADA, Congress mandated that the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) promulgate regulations implementing this 
requirement.90 At issue in the case was a regulation called Standard 
4.33.3, which states: 
Wheelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed 
seating plan and shall be provided so as to provide people 
with physical disabilities a choice of admission prices and 
lines of sight comparable to those for members of the 
general public . . . . At least one companion fixed seat shall 
be provided next to each wheelchair seating area. When the 
seating capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair spaces shall be 
provided in more than one location.91 
The main controversy between the parties was whether the 
requirement for there to be “lines of sight comparable to those for 
members of the general public” meant that wheelchair seats be 
situated to allow sightlines over standing spectators.92 DOJ 
interpreted this phrase to require all wheelchair seats provide a clear 
line of sight.93 DOJ’s interpretation, however, appeared to “constitute  
. . . a fundamental modification of its previous interpretation.”94 
 
87.   117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 88. Id. at 580; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. (1994). 
 89. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 580; see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (“No individual 
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 
accommodation.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (2012) (requiring that new facilities subject 
to the ADA must be “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities”). 
 90. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 580; see 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). 
 91. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 580–81 (citing 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App. A, 
§ 4.33.3 (1996)). 
 92. Id. at 586. 
 93. Id. at 582. 
 94. Id. at 586. 
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In analyzing this issue, the D.C. Circuit found, “Once an agency 
gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only change that 
interpretation as it would formally modify the regulation itself.”95 In 
other words, the DOJ was required to go through the process of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking if it had definitively interpreted the 
regulation at issue and now wanted to alter its prior interpretation.96 
The court explained agencies do not have the identical leeway to 
change their interpretations of regulations as they do when they 
change their interpretations of statutory provisions.97 The district 
court reasoned that an animating principle under Chevron deference, 
which applies to the review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute, 
is that “Congress has delegated implicitly to administrative agencies 
and departments the authority to reconcile, within reason, 
ambiguities in statutes that the agencies and departments are charged 
with administering.”98 And this delegation is “a continuing one” so 
that an agency may change its initial interpretation to take a different 
one (so long as it remains a reasonable construction of the statute).99 
The court further explained that although the deference doctrine 
relating to an agency’s interpretation of its regulation and the 
deference doctrine that applies to an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute (established in Chevron) are “analogous,” Congress has “said 
more . . . on the subject of regulations” in the APA.100 It pointed out 
that under the APA, agencies must follow notice-and-comment 
procedures while developing regulations, which includes “repeal” or 
“amendments” of regulations.101 With this requirement in mind, the 
court concluded “to allow an agency to make a fundamental change 
in its interpretation of a substantive regulation without notice and 
comment obviously would undermine those APA requirements.”102 
In the end, however, the court found that DOJ had not initially 
set forth an authoritative interpretation of the phrase “lines of sight 
comparable” so as to constitute an amendment or modification of its 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982) (APA notice-and-comment provision). 
 97. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586. 
 98. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Kelley v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 15 F.3d 1100, 1108 
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 82, 90 (D.C. Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 821 (1995). 
 99. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863). 
 100. Id. at 586; 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2012). 
 101. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586 (citing 5 U.S.C. §551(5)). 
 102. Id. 
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prior view.103 Nonetheless, the case was soon regarded as having 
created the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine: “Once an agency gives its 
regulation an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as 
it would formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of 
notice and comment rulemaking.”104 
C.  Mortgage Bankers’ Journey to the Supreme Court 
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the Mortgage Bankers case 
was heard by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and 
then on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. A brief summary of their decisions follows. 
Interestingly, neither court mentioned the Seminole Rock doctrine. 
1.  The District Court’s Decision 
In Mortgage Bankers Association v. Solis,105 the Mortgage 
Bankers Association (MBA), a national trade association that 
represents the real estate finance industry, filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief against the Department of Labor (DOL) under 
the APA.106 More specifically, MBA sought review of a DOL 
administrative interpretation that had conflicted with a previous DOL 
interpretation.107 
The case involved the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), where 
DOL had promulgated regulations to implement the FLSA.108 In 
general, the FLSA requires covered employers to pay overtime 
wages to employees who work more than forty hours per week.109 
However, there are exemptions in the FLSA such as one in section 
213(a)(1), which provides “any employee employed in a bona fide 
executive, administrative, or professional capacity[,] . . . or in the 
capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and 
delimited from time to time by regulations of the Secretary . . .),” is 
 
 103. Id. at 587. 
 104. Id. at 586. The court revisited (and re-affirmed) this holding later in Alaska Professional 
Hunters Ass’n v. Federal Aviation Administration, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), but the 
doctrine is most often cited as the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine. 
105.  864 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 106. Id. at 195. The defendants were Hilda Solis, in her official capacity as secretary of the 
United States Department of Labor, Nancy Leppink, in her official capacity as deputy 
administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of DOL, and DOL itself. Id. 
 107. Id. at 195. 
 108. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012). 
 109. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 195–96; 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 
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exempt from the “[m]inimum wage and maximum hour 
requirements” otherwise required by the Act.110 
Over the years, DOL had allegedly changed its interpretation of 
the scope of the exemption.111 Of specific interest to MBA was 
whether certain employees, such as mortgage loan officers, were 
subject to the FLSA exemption (meaning that they would not be 
eligible for over-time pay).112 For example, the DOL had released 
various opinion letters, as well as issued an administrative 
interpretation bulletin on the issue, which had explicitly withdrawn 
one of the previous opinion letters.113 In this bulletin, DOL allegedly 
changed its position by suggesting mortgage loan officers were not 
exempt from overtime pay requirements. It was this new 
interpretation that MBA challenged arguing, under the Paralyzed 
Veterans doctrine, the DOL was required to go through the process 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking to make such a change.114 
The district court began its analysis noting as a threshold matter 
it was permissible for an agency to change “its initial interpretation 
to adopt another reasonable interpretation.”115 But to do so under 
binding D.C. Circuit precedent the court further recognized that the 
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine might compel the agency to follow the 
notice-and-comment provisions. 
The court then addressed arguments by DOL that the Paralyzed 
Veterans doctrine conflicted with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.116 
For example, DOL asserted that the Court in Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.117 
held the APA’s notice-and-comment provisions “established the 
maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to 
have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking 
procedures.”118 According to DOL, because the Paralyzed Veterans 
doctrine requires an agency to follow the notice-and-comment 
 
 110. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 196; 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 
 111. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 196–201. 
 112. Id. at 198. 
 113. Id. at 201. 
 114. Id. MBA also argued that the bulletin conflicted with existing DOL regulations and was 
therefore arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law 
under the APA. Id.; Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). 
 115. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 203 (citing Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586). 
 116. Id. at 204. 
117.  435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 118. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 203; Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524. 
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process if the agency wants to change a prior interpretation of its 
own regulations, such a requirement constitutes an additional 
procedural requirement and is impermissible.119 
Without addressing the merits of DOL’s argument, the court 
found it was bound to adhere to controlling circuit precedent.120 It 
noted Vermont Yankee had been decided close to twenty years before 
Paralyzed Veterans so that the district court was “presumably aware” 
of Vermont Yankee when it created the doctrine.121 Moreover, it 
observed that the Paralyzed Veterans case has “remained good law 
in this Circuit for almost fifteen years.”122 
The court likewise dismissed DOL’s argument that the 
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine was invalidated by the Court’s 2009 
decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.123 There, DOL 
argued, the Court found the APA made no distinction “between 
initial agency action and subsequent agency action undoing or 
revising that action.”124 The district court, however, distinguished 
Fox Television on the basis that the Court was focused on whether 
the new interpretations contained in administrative orders at issue 
were arbitrary and capricious―not whether the new interpretations 
needed to have gone through the notice-and-comment process.125 
Therefore, the court found the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine remained 
the dispositive case on point.126 
Next, the court addressed DOL’s argument that two “purported 
exceptions” to the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine applied.127 First, 
according to DOL, the doctrine should not apply (i.e., it should not 
have to go through notice-and-comment rulemaking) unless the 
challenging party “substantially and justifiably” relied on the 
previous interpretation.128 Second, it asserted an “invalid prior 
interpretation” exception found in another D.C. Circuit case should 
apply.129 
 
 119. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 204. 
 120. Id. (quoting United States v. Torres, 115 F.3d 1033, 1036 (D.C. Cir.1997)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 205. 
 123. Id.; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
 124. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (citing Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 205–06. 
 128. Id. (citing MetWest Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 560 F.3d 506 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
 129. Id. at 206 (citing Monmouth Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 807 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
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With respect to whether a showing of substantial and justifiable 
reliance on the prior interpretation was required for the Paralyzed 
Veterans doctrine to apply, the court agreed with DOL that it was.130 
It found that a “core tenant” of the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine line 
of cases was a “substantial and justifiable reliance on a well-
established agency interpretation.”131 And because MBA had not met 
its burden to demonstrate sufficient reliance, the court held notice-
and-comment rulemaking was not required under the Paralyzed 
Veterans doctrine.132 
2.  The Decision by the Court of Appeals 
Although, as discussed above, the district court assessed many 
arguments raised by both parties, the only issue presented to the 
court of appeals was whether a party’s justifiable reliance on a 
previous interpretation is “a separate and independent requirement” 
when determining whether the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine 
applies.133 Significantly, DOL conceded on appeal that if the court 
found reliance was not a separate requirement, then the Paralyzed 
Veterans doctrine would apply thereby requiring them to go through 
the notice-and-comment process for its revised interpretation.134 
In analyzing the issue, the court of appeals rejected the lower 
court’s view that previous D.C. Circuit opinions held a party  
must demonstrate “substantial and justifiable reliance on a  
well-established agency interpretation.”135 To the contrary, the court 
found there was no separate reliance element under the Paralyzed 
Veterans doctrine.136 
The court explained the Paralyzed Veterans analysis consists of 
two elements: a definitive interpretation and a significant change in 
such interpretation.137 It rejected the view that some of its more 
recent cases had grafted an “independent third element: substantial 
and justified reliance.”138 The court explained the view that inquiring 
whether there had been reliance was merely part of the analysis as to 
 
 130. Id. at 207. 
 131. Id. at 208 (citing MetWest, 560 F.3d at 511). 
 132. Id. at 210. 
 133. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966, 967–68 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 134. Id. at 968. 
 135. Id. at 969 (quoting Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 204–05). 
 136. Id. at 968. 
 137. Id. at 969. 
 138. Id. (citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 628 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) and MetWest Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 560 F.3d 506 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
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whether the agency had set forth a “definitive interpretation.”139 It 
reasoned that “significant reliance functions as a rough proxy for 
definitiveness” because “regulated entities are unlikely to 
substantially—and often cannot be said to justifiably—rely on 
agency pronouncements lacking some or all the hallmarks of a 
definitive interpretation.”140 
Finally, the court rejected the DOL’s argument that “the only 
way to protect agencies from inadvertently locking in disfavored, 
informally promulgated positions is to impose a separate and 
independent reliance element.”141 It found since a party’s reliance 
should properly be treated as part of the definitiveness analysis, 
agencies will be adequately protected without making reliance a 
distinct element.142 The court therefore found for MBA and 
remanded the case with instructions to vacate the DOL’s bulletin 
containing the new interpretation.143 
IV.  CHIPPING AWAY AT THE ROCK 
A.  Introduction 
As my past articles on Seminole Rock detailed, the Supreme 
Court and lower courts have somewhat consistently applied the 
doctrine over the past seventy years.144 Yet it is not until very 
recently that justices have begun to analyze the doctrine critically. 
With respect to the Seminole Rock doctrine, several key observations 
can be made. 
First, the Supreme Court’s Seminole Rock doctrine jurisprudence 
shows a more searching review on whether to defer than the standard 
seems to require. But these opinions also show substantial 
inconsistency, even confusion, on how they interpret and apply the 
standard.145 
Second, it is evident that at least four justices would like to hear 
a case that raises the doctrine, so that the full Court can re-examine 
the doctrine. This is supported by the views expressed by Chief 
 
 139. Id. at 970. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 971. 
 142. Id. at 971–72. 
 143. Id. at 972. 
 144. Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 235. 
 145. Id. 
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Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito in recent 
opinions.146 
Third, it is safe to say that at least two justices (Justices Scalia 
and Thomas) would like to over-turn the Seminole Rock doctrine. 
Other members, however, have shown allegiance to the doctrine 
without thorough examination.147 
Fifth, and in sum, based on the recent interest and recognized 
importance of the Seminole Rock doctrine in our administrative state, 
Supreme Court review is certainly imminent where it will re-evaluate 
the doctrine. 
Therefore, the goal of this Part is to explain how the Court 
addressed the Seminole Rock doctrine and related administrative law 
issues in the recent case of Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association. 
In addition, given the Court’s interest in re-evaluating the doctrine in 
a future case, another goal of this Part is to facilitate the Court’s 
consideration of the doctrine. As such, this Part seeks to provide 
additional insight on the justices’ views on the Seminole Rock 
doctrine. 
B.  The Court’s Majority Opinion 
After making its way through the D.C. Circuit, Mortgage 
Bankers was heard by the Supreme Court in its 2014–2015 term.148 
On March 9, 2015, the Court released its opinion with Justice 
Sotomayor delivering the judgment on behalf of a unanimous 
court.149 In addition, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito each penned 
separate opinions concurring in the judgment.150 The central question 
presented in the case was whether the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine 
was consistent with the APA.151 And although the case did not 
directly raise the Seminole Rock doctrine, it was clear from the 
concurring opinions that the doctrine was directly on the minds of 
several justices. 
The Court began by introducing and summarizing the applicable 
provisions in the APA that federal administrative agencies institute 
 
 146. See infra. 
 147. See infra. 
 148. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1211 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 151. Id. at 1203; see 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). 
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when they promulgate rules.152 It noted the APA rulemaking 
provision also applies when agencies amend or repeal an existing 
rule, which is broadly defined to encompass “statement[s] of general 
or particular applicability and future effect” that are intended to 
“implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”153 
The process, set forth in APA section 553, which has been 
called “notice and comment rulemaking,” requires agencies to 
complete three steps.154 The agency must first give “notice” to the 
public, which is normally accomplished by publishing a notice of 
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.155 Next, the agency is 
required to “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or 
arguments”156 and then the agency must consider and reply to such 
comments.157 Finally, the APA requires an agency to include “a 
concise general statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose” in its 
final rule.158 These notice-and-comment rules, the Court explained, 
have the “force and effect of law” and have become known as 
“legislative rules.”159 
The Court next distinguished legislative rules from other types 
of rules, which are not subject to the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process, such as “interpretative rules, general statements 
of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”160 
It focused on interpretive rules noting that such rules are “issued by 
an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the 
statutes and rules which it administers.”161 Although it is generally 
easier for an agency to issue an interpretive rule (because it does not 
 
 152. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; see 5 U.S.C. § 551. 
 153. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)–(5). 
 154. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 155. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
 156. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 157. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; see Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 416 (1971); Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 158. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 159. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203 (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302–03 
(1979)). 
 160. Id. at 1203–04; 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). The Court noted that the APA does not define the 
term “interpretive rule” and “its precise meaning is the source of much scholarly and judicial 
debate.” Id. at 1204 (citing generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from 
Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547 (2000); Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 893 (2004)). The Court declined to “wade into that debate here.” Id. 
 161. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204 (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 
(1995)). 
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have to complete the notice-and-comment process), such rule does 
not have “the force and effect of law.”162 
Turning to the facts, the Court explained how the case involved 
DOL’s changing views on whether mortgage loan officers were 
covered by the FLSA’s minimum-wage and overtime compensation 
requirements.163 In 1999 and 2001, the DOL had determined in 
separate opinion letters that mortgage loan officers were not exempt 
from these requirements.164 In 2004, DOL promulgated regulations, 
using notice-and-comment procedures, suggesting that they might no 
longer be eligible.165 
Following the promulgation of these regulations, in 2006, the 
DOL issued yet another opinion letter, this time finding that 
mortgage loan officers were not subject to protection.166 The Court 
observed that this position was short-lived because in 2010 DOL 
changed course again by finding that because mortgage loan officers 
“have a primary duty of making sales for their employers,” they are 
protected under the FLSA’s wage and overtime provisions.167 As 
with its other opinion letters, the DOL did not follow notice-and-
comment procedures when issuing its 2010 interpretation.168 
The Court explained it was the 2010 interpretation that gave rise 
to the litigation.169 It briefly summarized both the opinion of the 
district court granting summary judgment to DOL and the opinion of 
 
 162. Id. (quoting Shalala, 514 U.S. at 99). 
 163. Id. at 1204–05; see 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 
 164. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204–05 (citing Loan Officers/Exempt Status, [6A WHM], Lab. Rel. 
Rep. (BNA) 99:8351 (Feb. 16, 2001) and Mortgage Loan Officers/Exempt Status, [6A WHM], 
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 99:8249 (May 17, 1999)). 
 165. Id. at 1205. The Court noted that the 2004 regulations featured a new section that 
contained several examples of employees who would not be eligible for minimum-wage and 
overtime compensation. Id. at 1204. (See 29 C.F.R. § 541.203 (2014)). For example, certain 
“[e]mployees in the financial services industry” would not be protected unless their “primary duty 
is selling financial products.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b)). 
 166. Id. at 1205 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter, at 70a–84a 
(Sept. 8, 2006),  http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2006/2006_09_08_31_FLSA.pdf. 
 167. Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 166, at 49a, 69a). DOL rescinded the 2006 
opinion letter and explained that the reasoning in the letter had improperly relied on “misleading 
assumption[s] and selective and narrow analysis” of the issue. Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
supra note 166, at 68a). 
 168. Id. at 1205. 
 169. Id. The Court reviewed MBA’s argument that DOL’s interpretation was inconsistent 
with the 2004 regulation and was therefore arbitrary and capricious under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706 (2012). Id. The Court also explained MBA’s argument that DOL’s interpretation was 
“procedurally invalid in light of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Paralyzed Veterans.” Id. It also 
noted how three former mortgage loan officers, named Beverly Buck, Ryan Henry, and Jerome 
Nickols, had intervened to support the DOL’s interpretation. Id. 
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the D.C. Circuit reversing the lower court’s decision.170 The Court 
then turned to the central question of whether the Paralyzed Veterans 
doctrine was consistent with the APA.171 Simply put, it had no 
problem concluding the doctrine was “contrary to the clear text of 
the APA’s rulemaking provisions.”172 
In finding that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine “improperly 
impose[d] on agencies an obligation beyond the ‘maximum 
procedural requirements’ specified in the APA,” the Court turned to 
the plain text of the APA.173 The Court explained the APA explicitly 
provides that unless “notice or hearing is required by statute,” the 
notice-and-comment requirement “does not apply . . . to 
interpretative rules.”174 Because of the categorical exemption of 
interpretive rules from the APA’s notice-and-comment provisions, 
the Court found the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine was fatally 
flawed.175 
The Court faulted the D.C. Circuit for ignoring this crucial 
provision when it analyzed the 2010 interpretation, which qualified 
as an interpretive rule.176 The D.C. Circuit had been correct when it 
concluded that the APA requires an agency to use the same 
procedure (such as notice and comment for legislative rules) when 
amending or repealing a rule as it does when it issues the rule in the 
first place.177 But the court of appeals had failed to account for the 
APA’s exemption for interpretive rules from the notice-and-
comment requirements that apply to legislative rules.178 
In other words, since an agency does not have to adhere to the 
notice-and-comment requirements when issuing an initial 
 
 170. Id.; Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 209–10 (finding on summary judgment that the 2010 
interpretation was not arbitrary or capricious); Harris, 720 F.3d at 971–72 (concluding that 
reliance was not a required element of the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine and holding that because 
DOL had conceded that it had made a prior, conflicting interpretation, its 2010 interpretation had 
to be vacated). 
 171. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1205. 
 172. Id. at 1205–06. 
 173. Id. (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 524 (1978)). 
 174. Id. at 1206 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (“[N]otice of 
proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Federal Register.”); id. § 553(c) (“[T]he agency 
shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making.”). 
 175. Id. at 1206. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(5)). See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 
515 (2009) (The APA “make[s] no distinction . . . between initial agency action and subsequent 
agency action undoing or revising that action.”). 
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interpretive rule, it does not have to follow those procedures if it 
subsequently chooses to amend or repeal that interpretive rule.179 The 
Court reasoned such a conclusion was harmonious “with 
longstanding principles of . . . administrative law jurisprudence.”180 
Under prior precedent, courts are not empowered “to impose upon 
[an] agency its own notion of which procedures are ‘best’ or most 
likely to further some vague, undefined public good,” beyond what is 
required under the APA.181 The Court stated “[t]o do otherwise 
would violate ‘the very basic tenet of administrative law that 
agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure.’”182 
The Court further explained the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine’s 
requirement that an agency must go through notice and comment for 
an interpretive rule is precisely an example of a “judge-made 
procedural right” that is the “responsibility of Congress or the 
administrative agencies, not the courts” to fashion.183 In the Court’s 
view, Congress had “weighed the costs and benefits of placing more 
rigorous procedural restrictions on the issuance of interpretive rules,” 
but “decided to adopt standards that permit agencies to promulgate 
freely such rules—whether or not they are consistent with earlier 
interpretations.”184 
Next, the Court addressed MBA’s arguments on why the 
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine should be found permissible.185 It first 
rejected MBA’s attempt to “bolster the D.C. Circuit’s reading of the 
APA” by arguing that a change in interpretation should qualify as a 
“repeal” or “amendment” of a regulation so as to require notice-and-
comment rulemaking.186 The Court found MBA’s argument 
unpersuasive because MBA had failed to reconcile that because 
 
 179. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1206. 
 180. Id. at 1207. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 549 (1978)). 
 183. Id.; see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 524 (Section 4 of the APA 
“established the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the 
courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.”); id. (“Agencies are free to 
grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are 
generally not free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them.”). 
 184. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1207 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 523 (In 
enacting the APA, Congress “settled long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enact[ed] a 
formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest.”) (quoting another 
source)). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 544, 549). 
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interpretive rules do not have the force and effect of law, a change in 
an interpretation of a regulation cannot be deemed to have amended 
or repealed that regulation.187 
The Court directed most of the remainder of its opinion 
explaining why the “practical and policy grounds” raised by MBA to 
defend the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine were unconvincing.188 In 
particular, the Court addressed MBA’s assertion the Paralyzed 
Veterans doctrine stops “agencies from unilaterally and unexpectedly 
altering their interpretation of important regulations.”189 
The Court first acknowledged there might be instances when an 
agency might choose to release an interpretive rule, instead of a 
legislative rule, in order to side-step the notice-and-comment 
requirement.190 However, the Court explained affected parties have 
the ability to address such situations.191 For example, it highlighted 
the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard imposes the 
requirement that an agency supply “more substantial justification 
when ‘its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those 
which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has 
engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into 
account.’”192 
The Court also was comforted by the fact that Congress, when 
drafting statutes, is aware agencies do sometimes change their 
interpretation, negatively affecting parties’ expectations.193 The 
Court noted Congress’s inclusion of “safe harbor” provisions to 
shield parties that have relied on past interpretations.194 And it cited 
to one example found in the FLSA, which states “no employer shall 
be subject to any liability” for failure “to pay minimum wages or 
overtime compensation” if it shows that the “act or omission 
complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance 
on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or 
interpretation” of the Administrator of the Department’s Wage and 
 
 187. Id. at 1207–08. 
 188. Id. at 1209. 
 189. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 16, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 
(2015) (Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052)). 
 190. Id. at 1209. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. (quoting Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515 (citation omitted)). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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Hour Division, even when the guidance is later “modified or 
rescinded.”195 
Finally, the Court refused to address MBA’s argument that if the 
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine is invalid, DOL’s 2010 interpretation is 
still impermissible because it should “be classified as a legislative 
rule”—not an interpretive rule.196 The Court explained, “[T]he 
parties litigated this suit on the understanding that the 
Administrator’s Interpretation was—as its name suggests—an 
interpretive rule.”197 Indeed, the Court quipped, that MBA itself had 
seemed to concede that DOL’s interpretation was an interpretive rule 
in raising the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine because the doctrine only 
applies to interpretive rules.198 Moreover—and more importantly—
the Court found MBA had waived its argument by not raising it in 
the lower courts or in its brief in opposition to certiorari.199 The 
Court reversed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit.200 
C.  Justice Alito’s Opinion 
Justice Alito concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.201 
He first opined the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine was “incompatible” 
with the APA.202 His opinion, however, did not focus on the 
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine or the facts presented in Mortgage 
Bankers. Switching gears, he recognized the D.C. Circuit might very 
well have fashioned the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine to address the 
“aggrandizement of the power of administrative agencies.”203 Such 
power, in his view, resulted from a combination of Congress’s 
delegation of broad lawmaking authority to agencies; agencies’ 
exploitation of the gray-area between legislative and interpretive 
rules; and the Seminole Rock deference doctrine.204 
Although Justice Alito did not discount these issues, he viewed 
the D.C. Circuit’s creation of the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine as “not 
 
 195. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 259(a), (b)(1) (2012)). 
 196. Id. at 1210. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. (citing SUP. CT. R. 15.2; Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395–96 (2009)). 
 201. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (declining to join Part 
III-B). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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a viable cure for these problems.”205 He further noted the Court could 
readily address one of the contributors to the amassment of agency 
power: the Seminole Rock doctrine.206 He cited to the separate 
opinions of both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas to highlight 
“substantial reasons why the Seminole Rock doctrine may be 
incorrect.”207 He concluded his short concurrence by announcing he 
was “await[ing] a case in which the validity of Seminole Rock may 
be explored through full briefing and argument.”208 
D.  Justice Scalia’s Opinion 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with both the 
decision and reasoning on why the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine 
could not be reconciled with the APA.209 But he then made clear that 
he did not agree with the “Court’s portrayal of the result” as being 
justifiable in light of Congress’s desire to allow agencies leeway to 
issue interpretive rules.210 Justice Scalia then immediately focused on 
the Court’s deference doctrines and on the Seminole Rock doctrine, 
in particular. He asserted the current deference doctrines that apply 
to agency determinations have skewed the balance that Congress 
originally sought when it created the APA.211 In other words, as a 
result of the Court’s development of an “elaborate law of deference 
to agencies’ interpretation of statutes and regulations,” agencies 
effectively can now “authoritatively resolve ambiguities” in both 
statues and regulations.212 
Justice Scalia explained as a result of the dramatic growth of our 
administrative state, the APA was enacted as a “check” to agency 
“zeal.”213 One principal method was to create the notice-and-
comment provisions, which, as the name suggests, requires an 
agency to notify the regulated community of the proposed rule, 
solicit comments on the rule, consider and reply to comments, and 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id.; see also Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168–69 (2012) 
(citing, inter alia, John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996)). 
 208. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 209. Id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950)). 
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then to justify the final rule or decision when the rule is 
completed.214 He pointed out another restraint on agency action was 
the APA’s requirement that it was the court’s role to then “interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.”215 Thus, according to 
Justice Scalia, Congress empowered courts to have the authoritative 
role to resolve ambiguities in statutes and regulations.216 
Although Justice Scalia conceded Congress carved out 
interpretive rules from these requirements, he asserted the import of 
this exemption has gone way beyond what Congress intended.217 
Properly construed and when read in conjunction with the 
commitment to courts to decide what regulations and statutes mean, 
Justice Scalia reasoned that the APA’s interpretive rules exemption 
does not augment an agency’s power.218 This is so because although 
an agency can use a legislative rule to inform the public of its 
interpretation of the law, it should not effectively bind the public 
(and does not have the force of law) because the reviewing court has 
the final word.219 
But in Justice Scalia’s view, the Court’s deference doctrines, 
including the Seminole Rock doctrine, has upended this balance.220 
As a result of the application of these agency deference doctrines 
during judicial review, the interpretive rules exemption from notice 
and comment has expanded an agency’s power.221 Instead of using 
interpretive rules as a method to notify the public, agencies can now 
bind the public because the agency will receive deference for its 
interpretation in its interpretive rule.222 Justice Scalia quipped 
“[i]nterpretive rules that command deference do have the force of 
law.”223 
Justice Scalia next criticized the majority for failing to 
adequately address this unintended result.224 Although (as the Court 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)–(c)). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 220. Id. at 1211. Justice Scalia also pointed out the Court has been relying on Seminole Rock 
even though it was decided before the APA was enacted. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 223. Id. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original). 
 224. Id. 
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had asserted) it is a court that “ultimately decides whether [the text] 
means what the agency says,” he asserted such a role is illusory 
when the court is required to defer under the controlling deference 
standard established under cases such as Chevron and Seminole 
Rock.225 Moreover, the end result means that agencies are able to 
make binding rules without following the notice-and-comment 
provisions in the APA.226 
Next, Justice Scalia zeroed in that the deference afforded to 
agency interpretation of its own regulations was especially 
problematic.227 In his view, Seminole Rock deference not only 
permits an agency to create binding regulations that are not subject to 
notice and comment, but allows an agency an even greater 
opportunity to expand its power than when it interprets statutory 
provisions.228 By creating broad and vague substantive regulations, 
an agency can later interpret these regulations through interpretive 
rules, which do not require notice and comment, and receive 
controlling deference for such interpretations.229 Congress, Justice 
Scalia contended, never envisioned this result in creating the APA.230 
Justice Scalia concluded by musing what should be done to 
address these substantial concerns.231 He acknowledged the creation 
of the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine by the D.C. Circuit was a 
“courageous (indeed, brazen) attempt” to address the problem as it 
relates to a revision of an earlier interpretation.232 But he recognized 
that the doctrine could not be supported due to the APA’s  
crystal-clear exemption for interpretive rules from notice-and-
comment procedures.233 He then proposed a solution that would 
“restore the balance originally struck by the APA with respect to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations”: abandon Seminole 
Rock.234 Such a result, in his view, would allow the APA to be 
 
 225. Id.; see Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); see Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 226. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 1212–1213 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 232. Id. at 1212. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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applied as written with no deference to agencies’ interpretations of 
their regulations.235 
E.  Justice Thomas’s Opinion 
Justice Thomas also concurred in the Court’s holding that the 
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine was incompatible with the APA.236 And 
he too wrote separately because the Paralyzed Veterans and 
Mortgage Bankers cases “call into question the legitimacy” of the 
Seminole Rock doctrine.237 But unlike the short opinions of Justice 
Alito and Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas’s opinion comprehensively 
laid out his view on the merits of the doctrine.238 In his view, 
Seminole Rock deference amounts to granting legal effect to an 
agency’s interpretation—rather than to the regulation itself.239 In 
doing so, he asserted that the doctrine “effects a transfer of the 
judicial power to an executive agency,” thereby “raising 
constitutional concerns.”240 He concluded that the deference regime 
established by Seminole Rock undercuts the courts’ duty to be a 
judicial check on the other branches and it “subjects regulated parties 
to precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”241 
Justice Thomas first reviewed the genesis of the doctrine by 
briefly exploring the Court’s opinion in Seminole Rock.242 He then 
asserted this “unsupported” standard “has taken on a life of its 
own.”243 Canvassing the “broad spectrum of subjects” where the 
Seminole Rock doctrine has been applied,244 he further observed the 
doctrine had been used when analyzing an agency’s interpretation of 
different agency’s regulations;245 when an agency had interpreted a 
regulation inconsistently over time;246 when interpretations were 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 1213–25. 
 239. Id. at 1213. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 1214. 
 244. Id. (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 358–59 (1989) 
(forests); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1971) (Selective Service); INS v. Stanisic, 
395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969) (deportation); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (oil and gas leases)). 
 245. Id. (citing Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–99 (1991)). 
 246. Id. (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 159, 170–71 (2007)). 
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issued both formally and informally;247 and even in case that did not 
involve “traditional agency regulations,” criminal sentencing.248 
In what Justice Thomas viewed as a “steady march toward 
deference,” he observed the only meaningful effort to cabin the 
doctrine was a sole case where the Court found an agency 
interpretation “plainly erroneous” under Seminole Rock in order to 
prevent an agency “under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to 
create de facto a new regulation.”249 And this “narrow limit” to the 
controlling deference standard, in his view, does not make up for 
constitutional infirmities inherent in the doctrine.250 
Justice Thomas first criticized the Court for on one hand 
stressing the importance of “separation of powers” and “the 
constitutional system of checks and balances” as being “essential to 
the protection of individual liberty,” but on the other hand applying a 
“‘more pragmatic, flexible approach’ to that design when it has 
seemed more convenient to permit the powers to be mixed.”251 He 
then proceeded to chart the history of the U.S. Constitution’s 
“particular blend of separated powers and checks and balances.”252 
In particular, he discussed “events of the 17th and 18th 
centuries” as having played a pivotal role in educating the framers of 
the Constitution.253 For example, he pointed to the English Civil War 
as having exposed political theorists to “the conflict between the 
King and Parliament, and the dangers of tyrannical government 
posed by each, they began to call for a clear division of authority 
between the two.”254 Scholars such as John Locke and Baron de 
 
 247. Id. (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). 
 248. Id. (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44–45 (1993) (finding that the 
Sentencing Commission’s commentary on its sentencing guidelines was “analogous to an agency 
interpretation of its own regulations, entitled to Seminole Rock deference”)). 
 249. Id. at 1214–15 (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)). He also 
noted that the Court on two occasions had “expressly found Seminole Rock deference inapplicable 
for other reasons.” Id. (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 
(2012) and Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256–57 (2006)). See Leske, Between Seminole 
Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5. 
 250. Id. at 1215. 
 251. Id. (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09 (2011) (quoting another source) 
and Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442 (1977)). 
 252. Id. (citing M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 38, 168–69 
(2d. ed. 1998)). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. (citing VILE, supra note 252, at 44–45, 48–49). Justice Thomas also quoted “a 1648 
work titled The Royalist’s Defence that offered perhaps the first extended account of the theory of 
the separation of powers: “[W]hilst the Supremacy, the Power to Judge the Law, and Authority to 
make new Lawes, are kept in severall hands, the known Law is preserved, but united, it is 
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Montesquieu elaborated on this theory and emphasized that 
separation of powers was essential to protect individual liberty.255 In 
addition, Justice Thomas observed these scholars had also believed 
that a system of checks and balances among the branches was 
necessary to buttress this separation.256 
He then explained the early development of the United States 
confirmed that both a separation of powers and checks and balances 
was important.257 While many state constitutions of the time did 
provide for separation of powers, there were no checks and balances 
in place.258 Later, when the Constitution was being drafted, the 
Framers, such as Madison, recognized this shortcoming: “experience 
has taught us a distrust” of the separation of powers alone as “a 
sufficient security to each [branch] [against] encroachments of the 
others” and “[i]t is necessary to introduce such a balance of powers 
and interests, as will guarantee the provisions on paper.”259 
Justice Thomas then described the separation of the main 
powers of the United States government into the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches and the numerous examples of 
checks and balances to reinforce this separation.260 And according to 
Madison, this constitutional paradigm was a “great security” for 
liberty.261 Justice Thomas elaborated the Framers viewed the 
separation of powers and checks and balances as “practical and real 
 
vanished, instantly thereupon, and Arbytrary and Tyrannicall power is introduced.” Id. (quoting 
CHARLES DALLISON, THE ROYALIST’S DEFENCE 80 (1648) (italics in original)). 
 255. Id. (citing VILE, supra note 252, at 63–64); see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF 
CIVIL GOVERNMENT, §§ 143–44, at 72 (J. Gough ed., 1947); BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE 
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151–52 (Oskar Piested, ed., Thomas Nugent trans., New York Hafner 
Publishing Co. 1949). 
 256. Id. at 1215–16 (citing VILE, supra note 252, at 72–73, 102). 
 257. Id. at 1216. 
 258. Id. (citing VILE, supra note 252, at 147). For instance, states “actively placed traditional 
executive and judicial functions in the legislature,” so that some “state legislatures arrogated 
power to themselves and began to confiscate property, approve the printing of paper money, and 
suspend the ordinary means for the recovery of debts.” Id. (citing G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 155–56, 403–09 (1969)). 
 259. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1216 (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
at 77 (M. Farrand rev., 1966)). 
 260. Id. (The Framers “gave Congress specific enumerated powers to enact legislation, Art. I, 
§ 8, but gave the President the power to veto that legislation, subject to congressional override by 
a supermajority vote, Art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3. They gave the President the power to appoint principal 
officers of the United States, but gave the Senate the power to give advice and consent to those 
appointments. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. They gave the House and Senate the power to agree to adjourn 
for more than three days, Art. I, § 5, cl. 4, but gave the President the power, “in Case of 
Disagreement between them,” to adjourn the Congress “to such Time as he shall think proper.” 
Art. II, § 3, cl. 3.”); see U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. 
 261. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
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protections for individual liberty,” which he believed the judiciary 
(like the other branches) must protect.262 And to Justice Thomas, the 
Seminole Rock doctrine represented the Court’s abdication of this 
duty.263 
Justice Thomas next detailed his reasoning on why the Seminole 
Rock doctrine raises constitutional concerns.264 In his view, the 
doctrine results in “a transfer of judicial power to the Executive 
Branch, and it amounts to an erosion of the judicial obligation to 
serve as a ‘check’ on the political branches.”265 
First, Justice Thomas explained once a party invokes the power 
of Article III court to hear a case, the court has an obligation to 
“exercise its independent judgment in interpreting and expounding 
upon the laws.”266 And the Framers knew in many cases there would 
arise ambiguities in the law.267 Thus, inherent in the judicial power 
was the authority of courts to resolve ambiguities in adjudicating a 
case or controversy.268 Justice Thomas observed the legislative and 
executive branches are also empowered to interpret the law, but that 
“the judicial interpretation would be considered authoritative in a 
judicial proceeding.”269 
In support of the view that courts should have the role to give 
the authoritative view of the law, Justice Thomas explained that 
judges were historically understood to be exercising their 
independent judgment.270 This “independent judgment” meant that a 
judge should follow the law without succumbing to personal biases 
 
 262. Id. at 1216–17 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[The Constitution] is a prescribed structure, a framework, for the conduct of 
government. In designing that structure, the Framers themselves considered how much 
commingling [of governmental powers] was, in the generality of things, acceptable, and set forth 
their conclusions in the document.”)). 
 263. Id. at 1217. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“judicial Power of the United States”)). 
 267. Id. (citing Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: 
Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 20–21 & n. 66 (2000) and Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525–26 (2003)); see also id. (quoting James Madison, “All new laws, 
though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature 
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 
229 (James Madison)). 
 268. Id. (noting that Alexander Hamilton agreed: “[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper 
and peculiar province of the courts,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
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or “pressure from the political branches, the public, or other 
interested parties.”271 He asserted to better insulate judges, the 
Framers built safeguards into the Constitution such as allowing 
judges to “hold their Offices during good Behaviour” and receive “a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office.”272 By contrast, Justice Thomas explained, 
the Framers chose to not insulate the legislative and executive 
branches from external pressures; instead, the “Constitution tie[s] 
them to those pressures.”273 
In his view, these differences in the branches support the notion 
that “judicial interpretations are definitive in cases and controversies 
before the courts.”274 Justice Thomas reasoned courts act as “an 
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, 
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to 
their authority.”275 Unlike the uninsulated legislature and executive, 
which “may be swayed by popular sentiment to abandon the 
strictures of the Constitution or other rules of law,” the judiciary “is 
duty bound to exercise independent judgment in applying the 
law.”276 
Justice Thomas then asserted the interpretation of agency 
regulations requires such independent judgment because “substantive 
regulations have the force and effect of law.”277 And “[a]gencies and 
private parties alike can use these regulations in proceedings against 
regulated parties.”278 He noted, “Just as it is critical for judges to 
exercise independent judgment in applying statutes, it is critical for 
judges to exercise independent judgment in determining that a 
regulation properly covers the conduct of regulated parties.”279 And 
 
 271. Id. at 1218 (quoting Philip Hamburger, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 508–21 (2008)). 
 272. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
 273. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing for election of members of the House 
of Representatives every two years); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing for selection of 
members of the Senate every six years); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (providing for the president 
to be subject to election every four years.)). 
 274. Id. at 1219. 
 275. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 276. Id.  
 277. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–32 (2001)). 
 278. Id. (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2164–65 (2012) 
(private party relying on Department of Labor regulations)); see also FCC v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (agency issuing notices of liability under regulations). 
 279. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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“[d]efining the legal meaning of the regulation is one aspect of that 
determination.”280 
Justice Thomas next revealed what his view on the Seminole 
Rock doctrine would likely be in a future case. In his view, Seminole 
Rock deference nullifies the courts’ role to give their independent 
judgment.281 By giving “controlling weight” to an agency’s 
interpretation of a regulation, the courts’ power to interpret the 
regulation is essentially transferred to the agency.282 In other words, 
by taking away traditional tools of interpretation to define the 
meaning of a regulation, a judge is instead confined to the narrow 
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” standard.283 
And because the agency is part of the executive branch and “lacks 
the structural protections for independent judgment adopted by the 
Framers, including the life tenure and salary protections of Article 
III,” “the transfer of interpretive judgment raises serious separation 
of powers concerns.”284 
He also maintained Seminole Rock was constitutionally suspect 
because it undercuts the check by the judiciary on the other 
branches.285 Justice Thomas asserted “the enforcement of the rule of 
law” is the judiciary’s principal check and that “Article III judges 
cannot opt out of exercising their check.”286 But in his view, there is 
no proper exercise of independent judgment (i.e., application of the 
rule of law) when courts defer to an agency that has both created the 
regulation and enforced that same regulation.287 By not engaging in 
the exercise of determining what the best interpretation of a 
regulation is, courts have abdicated their responsibility to provide a 
judicial check.288 
Justice Thomas opined, under this deference paradigm, agencies 
amass power by permitting them to alter “the meaning of regulations 
 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 1219–20 (citing 1 S. JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 499 (4th 
ed. 1773) (defining “[d]efer” as “to leave to another’s judgment”)). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 1220. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 1220–21 (noting that “[t]he Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly 
before it, even those it ‘would gladly avoid’”) (citation omitted). 
 287. Id. at 1221. 
 288. Id. 
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at their discretion and without any advance notice to the parties.”289 
Although he applauded the D.C. Circuit’s attempt to address this 
issue by creating the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine as being 
“practically sound,” he recognized the doctrine was “legally 
erroneous” because of the plain language of the APA.290 He then 
used the facts presented in the case to illustrate his point by pointing 
to the 2006 and 2010 interpretations of the DOL.291 If a court were to 
give controlling deference to both conflicting interpretations, he 
pointed out, “regulated entities are subject to two opposite legal rules 
imposed under the same regulation.”292 In other words, a regulation 
could have two different meanings, depending on what interpretation 
an agency proffered at any given time. 
He concluded the important goal of having regulations give 
proper notice to regulated parties is not fulfilled under Seminole 
Rock’s deference regime.293 Rather, although notice is given through 
the promulgation of the regulation, notice is accomplished “only [in] 
a limited sense,” because the agency can subsequently interpret it 
differently later.294 Therefore, to Justice Thomas, a new 
interpretation, which did not go through notice and comment, might 
as well be a new regulation.295 
Justice Thomas next turned to a discussion that will be of 
immense importance when the Court examines the Seminole Rock 
doctrine in a future case. In this section, Justice Thomas identifies 
and then rejects various theoretical justifications that have been 
offered to support the Seminole Rock doctrine.296 
First, he responded to the theory that came from one of the 
Court’s previous Seminole Rock cases that the doctrine is grounded 
in the agency’s experience and expertise when overseeing “‘a 
complex and highly technical regulatory program’ in which the 
identification and classification of relevant ‘criteria necessarily 
require significant expertise and entail the exercise of judgment 
 
 289. Id. (finding that this “abandonment permits precisely the accumulation of governmental 
powers that the Framers warned against” and citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 302 (James 
Madison)). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 1222. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 1221. 
 296. Id. at 1222. 
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grounded in policy concerns.’”297 To him, this argument fails 
because the court’s role is to determine what the regulation means, 
rather than to ascertain what the preferred policy choice should be.298 
He reasoned since “substantive agency regulations have the ‘force 
and effect of law,’” the courts should interpret such regulations like 
any other type of law.299 In the end, he asserted the agency-expertise 
rationale was more to support “the wisdom of according agencies 
broad flexibility to administer statutory schemes” rather than an 
agency’s own experience in interpreting its own regulation.300 This  
policy-rationale, however, remains cabined by constitutional limits 
and thus was unpersuasive as a basis to support the doctrine.301 
Second, Justice Thomas addressed the arguments that the 
Seminole Rock doctrine was justified because the original intent 
behind a particular regulation is best left to the agency that wrote 
it.302 He rejected this basis by noting the Court had granted deference 
to an agency that had not been the original creator of the 
regulation.303 But this point aside, Justice Thomas stressed the 
agency’s intent should not be dispositive because “the text of the 
regulations . . . have the force and effect of law,” and thus should 
remain the focus of the inquiry.304 He pointed out that the APA 
 
 297. Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)); see Leske, 
Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 253–57 (discussing the Thomas 
Jefferson University case). 
 298. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1222. 
 299. Id. (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010) (stating 
courts should “assum[e] that the ordinary meaning of the regulation’s language expresses” its 
purpose and enforce it “according to its terms”)). 
 300. Id. at 1223. 
 301. Id. (“But policy arguments supporting even useful ‘political inventions’ are subject to the 
demands of the Constitution which defines powers and . . . sets out . . . how those powers are to 
be exercised.” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983))). 
 302. Id. (“Because the Secretary [of Labor] promulgates th[e] standards, the Secretary is in a 
better position . . . to reconstruct the purpose of the regulations in question.” (quoting Martin v. 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152 (1991))). 
 303. Id. (applying “Seminole Rock deference to one agency’s interpretation of another 
agency’s regulations because Congress had delegated authority to both to administer the 
program” (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–98 (1991)). He also 
pointed out that the Court had “likewise granted Seminole Rock deference to agency 
interpretations that are inconsistent with interpretations adopted closer in time to the 
promulgation of the regulations.” (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 159, 
170–71 (2007))). 
 304. Id. at 1223–24 (emphasis added) (“Citizens arrange their affairs not on the basis of their 
legislators’ unexpressed intent, but on the basis of the law as it is written and promulgated.” 
(quoting Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 119 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting))). 
414 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:375 
rulemaking process applies to the text of a regulation and the 
public’s reliance interests are based on that text.305 
Third, Justice Thomas responded to the theory that Seminole 
Rock deference naturally follows from an implicit delegation from 
Congress.306 In other words, “[b]ecause applying an agency’s 
regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the 
agency’s unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, . . . the 
power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component 
of the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”307 But in Justice 
Thomas’s view, Congress cannot bestow such a power upon the 
agency because the Constitution does not grant such a power to 
Congress itself.308 Thus, because Congress cannot set forth “a 
judicially binding interpretation” of a law or regulation, it cannot 
vest an agency with that power.309 
To support his view, he pointed to separation of power 
principles that require the legislative and judicial power to remain 
separate.310 He asserted the Constitution contained an “essential 
balance” in which Congress is “possessed of power to ‘prescrib[e] 
the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be 
regulated,’ but the power of ‘[t]he interpretation of the laws’ [is] ‘the 
proper and peculiar province of the courts.’”311 The power for 
agencies to definitively interpret their regulations would therefore 
upset this balance especially because “the power to create legally 
binding interpretations rests with the Judiciary.”312 
Fourth and finally, Justice Thomas responded to a 1907 remark 
in a speech that “independence and esteem” of judges might be 
called into question by “too much oversight of administrative 
 
 305. Id. at 1224 (suggesting that for similar reasons the courts should also not give binding 
deference “to post[-]enactment expressions of intent by individual Members of Congress” (citing 
Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631–32 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part))). 
 306. Id. (citing Martin, 499 U.S. at 151). 
 307. Id. (quoting Martin, 499 U.S. at 151). 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. (comparing in a similar context that “[t]he structure of the Constitution does not 
permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its 
control what it does not possess” (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986))). 
 310. Id. (noting the “sharp necessity to separate the legislative from the judicial power” 
(quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221 (1995))). 
 311. Id. (citation omitted) (third brackets added) (quoting Plaut, 514 U.S. 211, 222 (1995)). 
 312. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179–80 (1803)). 
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matters.”313 He explained his theory that if courts were have to 
resolve administrative issues, which “lie close to the public 
impatience,” judges would be “expose[d] to the fire of public 
criticism.”314 But Justice Thomas quickly dismissed this scenario as 
being yet another policy argument that could not trump the 
Constitution and its division of power among the branches; 
regardless of how unpopular a decision, the judiciary is required to 
interpret and apply the law.315 
Justice Thomas concluded his concurrence by noting although 
the resolution of the Mortgage Bankers case only required the Court 
to look to the text of the APA, “closer scrutiny reveal[ed] serious 
constitutional questions lurking beneath” with respect to the 
Seminole Rock doctrine.316 And although he freely recognized that 
stare decisis was an important feature to keep our legal system stable, 
he made clear that because the Court’s ultimate goal was “to decide 
by our best lights what the Constitution means,” he would overrule 
Seminole Rock doctrine in an appropriate case.317 
E.  The Justices’ Views on the Seminole Rock Doctrine 
All the opinions in the Mortgage Bankers case shed light on the 
justices’ views on the Seminole Rock doctrine. While it is impossible 
to predict whether their views will remain consistent in a future case, 
it is possible to make observations based on these opinions. 
Although Justice Sotomayor’s opinion announcing the judgment 
of the unanimous Court did not directly address the Seminole Rock 
doctrine, the judgment itself implicates the doctrine in a significant 
way. One main criticism of the doctrine lays at the heart of the 
Mortgage Bankers case in that giving an agency controlling 
deference for an interpretation of its regulation, as Justice Scalia had 
pointed out, can allow an agency to create a new regulation without 
going through the notice-and-comment process. Although the D.C. 
Circuit attempted to cure this issue by requiring an agency to follow 
the notice-and-comment provisions when an agency changes its 
interpretation of a regulation, the Court rejected this requirement. In 
 
 313. Id. at 1224–25 (quoting Charles Evans Hughes, Speech before the Elmira Chamber of 
Commerce (May 3, 1907), in ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, 1906–1916, at 185, 185–
7 (2d ed. 1916)). 
 314. Id. at 1225. 
 315. Id. at1225. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. (quoting McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 812 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
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striking down the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, the Court rejected a 
safeguard that courts and scholars had identified as a problem with 
the Seminole Rock doctrine. Therefore, the decision removed an 
existing safeguard in the D.C. Circuit and other circuits that followed 
the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine. Thus, when the Court re-examines 
the Seminole Rock doctrine, it will now have to grapple with this 
issue when determining whether the doctrine should remain or 
whether it needs modification to address the concerns identified by 
the other justices. 
Next, despite being short, Justice Alito’s opinion is significant 
for several reasons. First, there is now virtually no doubt that he will 
vote to hear a case that squarely raises a Seminole Rock issue. His 
opinion echoes the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in 
Decker that he joined in 2013.318 In that opinion, the chief justice 
wrote it “may be appropriate to reconsider [Seminole Rock] in an 
appropriate case” where “the issue is properly raised and argued.”319 
Thus, Supreme Court practitioners should be able to rely on his vote 
to grant certiorari in a future Seminole Rock case. 
Second, it is likewise clear that Justice Alito is wary about the 
amount of power that agencies have under our current political and 
legal scheme—especially as it affects regulated entities.320 He 
expressed an “understandable concern” about agency power even 
though he voted to strike down the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.321 
Likewise, it is probative that he did not join all of the Court’s 
opinion.322 Justice Alito declined to join Part III-B in which the 
Court found regulated entities “are not without recourse” when an 
agency takes advantage of the grey area between legislative and 
interpretive rules.323 The Court had cited to “a variety of constraints 
on agency decisonmaking,” including the arbitrary and capricious 
standard and the inclusion of “safe harbor” provisions in statutes to 
shield regulated entities from liability when they rely on previous 
agency interpretation.324 
 
 318. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338–39 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
 319. Id. 
 320. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. (declining to join Part III-B). 
 323. Id. at 1209–10. 
 324. Id. 
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It naturally follows that Justice Alito was therefore not in 
complete agreement that regulated entities have sufficient recourse to 
protect themselves from agency power and consequently he would 
likely be amenable to providing a better “check” to agency power.325 
His recognition that the Court can address excess agency power 
through a re-evaluation of “the validity” of the doctrine similarly 
shows that he might vote in favor of scaling back on the doctrine or 
even dispensing with the doctrine altogether.326 The question 
remains, however, whether Justice Alito’s allegiance to stare decisis 
will prove to be an insurmountable impediment him from 
overturning the doctrine. 
Third, Justice Alito’s opinion is notable for the glaring absence 
of Chief Justice Roberts as a signatory. As explained, the chief 
justice penned a very similar opinion in 2012, which Justice Alito 
joined. It is indeed curious why the chief justice did not join Justice 
Alito’s opinion. Possible rationale include his disagreement with 
Justice Alito’s language suggesting he agreed with Justice Thomas 
and Justice Scalia’s view that Seminole Rock may be incorrect. Or, 
given his allegiance to stare decisis, Chief Justice Roberts might 
have questioned whether the Court should or could rectify the issue 
by overruling Seminole Rock, as Justice Alito seemed to suggest.327 
In any event, while it seems likely that based on his concurrence in 
Decker, Chief Justice Roberts will also vote to hear a case raising 
Seminole Rock in the future, his view on whether Seminole Rock 
should be abandoned remains unclear.328 
Justice Scalia’s opinion is also significant in several respects. 
First, like Justice Alito, it is clear that Justice Scalia would vote to 
hear a case raising the Seminole Rock doctrine. His opinion in 
Mortgage Bankers, as well as his past opinions highlighting the 
doctrine, makes this proposition virtually indisputable.329 
Second, unlike determining Justice Alito’s view on the validity 
and vitality of the Seminole Rock doctrine, there is no question as to 
Justice Scalia’s positions on these issues. His opinion expressly calls 
 
 325. See id. at 1210. 
 326. See id. 
 327. See id. 
 328. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338–39 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
 329. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Talk America, Inc. 
v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265 (2011) (Scalia, J. concurring); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 
1326 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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for the abandonment of the controlling deference standard 
established in Seminole Rock.330 
Third, however, a more nuanced question remains. Although 
Justice Scalia concluded his opinion indicating that he would give 
“no deference to the agency . . . whether [its] interpretation is 
correct,” it remains to be seen whether he would still endorse any of 
the Court’s other deference doctrines that might otherwise apply, 
such as the lesser standard established in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.331 
Of course, Justice Thomas’s opinion with respect to his view of 
the Seminole Rock doctrine speaks for itself. His assessment and 
subsequent rejections of the various foundations proposed for 
Seminole Rock should help inform the future evaluation of the 
doctrine in a future case. But Justice Thomas has often set forth a 
“minority” view of the division of constitutional powers and the 
judicial role. It is naturally unclear whether he can convince enough 
justices to adopt his view—especially since none of the other 
concurring justices joined in any part of his opinion. With that said, 
with Justice Scalia firmly of a similar view, and Justice Alito and 
Chief Justice Roberts on the record as wanting to re-evaluate the 
doctrine, it is too early to tell. 
Nonetheless, it seems clear that Justice Thomas would likely 
endorse any significant change in the doctrine, even if it does not go 
so far as an outright rejection of it. This, however, could take on 
many forms. Any such modification would have to ensure that the 
courts have the ultimate role in determining the meaning of the 
regulation thereby preserving the courts’ duty to give their 
independent judgment. Whether it would be acceptable to re-
formulate the current Seminole Rock standard to yield a lesser 
deferential standard or whether resorting to the non-controlling 
Skidmore standard would be permissible to him is also unclear. 
Last, and of special importance, is Justice Thomas’s clear 
statement that he is not bound by stare decisis in circumstances when 
he believes proper adherence to the Constitution requires deviating 
from it. It will be interesting to see, however, whether there will be 
enough justices who are willing to go as far as overturning a doctrine 
that has been an integral part of our administrative state for the past 
seventy years. 
 
 330. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 331. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Although the Mortgage Bankers decision did not radically alter 
the Seminole Rock doctrine as some scholars predicted, it is clear the 
various opinions demonstrate a “chipping away” at the Seminole 
Rock doctrine. And it is equally clear the Court will reconsider the 
doctrine in an appropriate case. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether this will lead to a complete fracture, such as an outright 
rejection of the doctrine, or simply flakes and fragments, such as a 
more structured test or further limits on the doctrine’s application to 
address the justices’ concerns. 
In sum, the various opinions addressing the Seminole Rock 
doctrine demonstrate there are legitimate constitutional concerns 
with the doctrine, as well as practical issues. These concerns 
combined with the current confusion and inconsistency by the courts 
when applying the doctrine strongly militates in favor of  
re-evaluating the doctrine as soon as possible. Because our 
administrative state relies on consistency and uniformity in order to 
promote fairness, the current questions revolving around the 
Seminole Rock doctrine considerably hamper these principles. 
Therefore, a meaningful reconsideration of the doctrine would be an 
important step to bringing clarity in this important area of 
administrative law. 
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